

NIB ANNUAL REPORT 2015

Ministry of transport, construction
and regional development of the Slovak republic

SLOVAKIA

PREFACE TO THE REPORT

In Slovak republic the Unit responsible for Investigation of Railway Accidents is an integral part of the Ministry of transport, construction and regional development of the Slovak republic. The Ministry is an investigation body in case of accidents and extraordinary events occurred on railroads. The aim of this unit is the investigation of the causes and circumstances of railway accidents and incidents. This investigation leads to the development of the safety on railways.

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1 INTRODUCTION TO THE INVESTIGATION BODY

1.1 Legal Basis (or Legal framework)

In Slovakia the investigation of rail serious accidents, minor accidents and incidents is based on the EU Railway Safety Directive and on the national law 513/2009 Coll.

The investigating body shall investigate the causes of circumstance of serious accidents occurred in the railway infrastructure and affecting the safety of the system. The accident or extraordinary event investigations shall be without prejudice to the obligation of the infrastructure manager and the railway undertaking to determine their causes in their own operation and among their own employees with the aim to take measures to prevent from the accident repeating or to improve globally the railway system safety. They shall inform the investigating body and the safety authority about taken measures.


1.2 Role and Aim

The NIB in Slovak republic was founded in 1.1.2010, and the objective of investigation shall be accident prevention and options concerning the further improvement of the safety of the existing railway system and in no case the questions associated with apportioning blame or legal liability of particular persons.

1.3 Organisation

NIB of Slovak republic is independent in its organisation and legal structure from any infrastructure manager, railway undertakings, bodies and other persons whose interests could conflict with the tasks entrusted to the investigating body. The Unit for Investigation of Railway Accidents is a structural unit at the Ministry of transport, construction and regional development set up by the Government of the Republic. The NIB has totaly 4 employees. All costs of the unit are covered from the budget of the Ministry of of transport, construction and regional development. The Unit for Investigation of Railway Accidents does not have its own budget.

1.4 Organisational flow



The employees who are responsible for investigation of the causes and circumstances of railway accidents and incidents are members of Section of railways transport and railroads. The function of the national investigation body is performed by four employees of this section.

2 INVESTIGATION PROCESSES

2.1 Cases to be investigated

The investigating body shall investigate the causes of circumstance of serious accidents occurred in the railway infrastructure and affecting the safety of the system.

The investigating body shall investigate also the minor accident or the extraordinary event, including technical failures in the structural subsystems or components, which when repeating and under slightly different conditions might have led to serious accident. It shall take into account:

- a) the seriousness of the accident or extraordinary event,
- b) whether the accident or extraordinary event forms part of a series of events or a chain of associated events which might endanger the whole existing railway system,
- c) whether the accident or extraordinary event has an impact also on the safety of the European Community railway system, and
- d) requests and suggestions of the infrastructure manager, railway undertakings, the safety authority or authorities of the Member States.

The accident or extraordinary event investigations shall be without prejudice to the obligation of the infrastructure manager and the railway undertaking to determine their causes in their own operation and among their own employees with the aim to take measures to prevent from the accident repeating or to improve globally the railway system safety. They shall inform the investigating body and the safety authority about taken measures.

2.2 Institutions involved in investigations

The extent of investigations, the person of investigator or the composition of the investigation commission as well as the procedure to be followed in carrying out such investigations shall be determined by the investigating body, taking into account the objective and principles of the accident prevention and the lessons which may be used to improve the safety of the existing railway system

The investigation shall be conducted independently of any investigation carried out by the Police Corps or other body concerning the questions of the blame and liability of particular persons (hereinafter referred to as the "police inquiry") and of the investigation conducted by the infrastructure manager or the railway undertaking.

The police inquire executor may apply the investigating body for investigation of the case other than the accident in the railway infrastructure. The investigating body may satisfy this requirement if such an investigation does not endanger the investigation of a serious accident or the independence of its investigation. The same apply if the other state authority applies for investigation.

2.3 Investigation process or approach of the IB

The infrastructure manager and railway undertaking shall be obliged immediately after finding to report an accident or an extraordinary event to the coordination centre of Integrated Rescue System, the investigating body and the Railway Police; this shall not apply in case of an incident and an extraordinary event of the incident importance. An extraordinary event of the incident importance shall be report to the Railway Police only when it is results from the human activity.

The report pursuant to previous paragraph shall include all data necessary to start the rescue works in particular the site, time, type, consequences and other known circumstances.

The investigation shall mean a procedure prevention which includes the gathering and analysis of information about the accident or the extraordinary event, the preparing the final report containing the conclusions and the determination of causes of the accident or the origin of an extraordinary event as well as the making of safety recommendations for the infrastructure manager and the railway undertaking. The objective of investigation shall be accident prevention and options concerning the further improvement of the safety of the existing railway system and in no case the questions associated with apportioning blame or legal liability of particular persons.

The investigating body shall conclude its examinations at the accident site within the shortest possible time in order to enable the railway undertaking to remove damaged railway vehicle and the infrastructure manager to restore the infrastructure operation for the railway transport.

The investigating body shall be obliged to inform the European railway agency about the investigation beginning within one week of such beginning.. Such information shall include the date, time and accident site, as well as its type and its consequences as regards the number of fatalities and injuries and extent of the damage.

3 INVESTIGATIONS

3.1 Overview of investigations completed, identifying key trends

Type of accidents investigated	Number of accidents	Number of victims		Damages in € (approximation)	Trends in relation to previous years
		Deaths	Ser.Injur		
SPAD	3	0	0	-	-
Derailments	1	0	0	97 587,97	-
Level-crossing accident	1	0	0	1 500,00	-

3.2 Investigations commenced in 2015

Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation (Occurrence type, location)	Legal basis
3. 11. 2015	Level crossing accident between Petrovce nad Laborcom zast. and Michalovce	ii

Basis for investigation: i = According to the Safety Directive, ii = On national legal basis (covering possible areas excluded in Article 2, §2 of the Safety Directive), iii = Voluntary – other criteria (National rules/regulations not referred to the Safety Directive).

3.3 Research studies (or Safety Studies) commissioned and completed in 2015

Safety Studies completed in 2015

Date of commission	Title of the Study (Occurrence type, location)	Legal basis	Completed (date)
	none		

Basis for investigation: i = According to the Safety Directive, ii = On national legal basis (covering possible areas excluded in Article 2, §2 of the Safety Directive), iii = Voluntary – other criteria (National rules/regulations not referred to the Safety Directive).

Safety Studies commenced in 2015

Date of commission	Title of the Study (Occurrence type, location)	Legal basis
	none	

Basis for investigation: i = According to the Safety Directive, ii = On national legal basis (covering possible areas excluded in Article 2, §2 of the Safety Directive), iii = Voluntary – other criteria (National rules/regulations not referred to the Safety Directive).

3.4 Summaries of investigations completed in 2015

NIB SK completed 5 investigations in 2015. It were investigated and completed 1 case of derailments, 1 case of level crossing accident and 3 cases of SPAD.

3.5 Summaries of investigations commenced in 2015

One investigation of Level crossing accident commenced in year 2015 was not closed and it is carried over to the next year.

3.6 Comment and introduction or background to the investigations

Investigations commenced in 2015 and not followed

Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation (Occurrence type, location)	Legal basis	Reason of non following or suspension of investigations	Who, why, when (decision)
	none			

Basis for investigation: i = According to the Safety Directive, ii = On national legal basis (covering possible areas excluded in Article 2, §2 of the Safety Directive), iii = Voluntary – other criteria (National rules/regulations not referred to the Safety Directive).

3.7 Accidents and incidents investigated during last five years (in 2011–2015)

Rail investigations by NIB SK in 2011–2015

Accidents investigated		2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	TOT
Serious accidents (Art 19, 1 + 2)	Train collision	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Train collision with an obstacle	0	0	1	0	0	1
	Train derailment	0	0	0	1	1	2
	Level-crossing accident	0	0	1	1	1	3
	Accident to person caused by RS in motion	1	2	0	0	0	3
	Fire in rolling stock	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Involving dangerous goods	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other accidents (Art 21.6)	Train collision	-	1	-	-	0	1
	Train collision with an obstacle	-	0	-	-	0	0
	Train derailment	-	2	-	-	0	2
	Level-crossing accident	-	0	-	-	0	0
	Accident to person caused by RS in motion	-	0	-	-	0	0
	Fire in rolling stock	-	0	-	-	0	0
	Involving dangerous goods	-	0	-	-	0	0
Incidents	-	2	-	-	3	5	
TOTAL		1	7	2	2	5	17

4 RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Short review and presentation of recommendations

NIB SK made recommendations which may be used to improve the safety of the existing railway system separately for each cause.

4.2 Recommendations 2015

Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation, Safety recommendations
3. 8. 2015	SPAD: Bratislava-Lamac station
	Addressee IM: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • consider the possibility of transmission signals on-board a vehicle on all lines Addressed to RU: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • retrain the employee of RU about the methodology what to do when train is dispatched by conductor and engine-driver has not outlook on signals
13. 8. 2015	Level crossing accident: between stations Mnichova Lehotá and Bánovce nad Bebravou
	Addressee to IM: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IM examine if the rules obtains all needed provisions (eg .: instruction of train running technique) and in case of absence of this provision - suggest ways how to incorporate them to the rules of IM which are binding for the railway undertaking, Addressed to RU: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The RU shall conduct controls of train drivers and mentoring about train running technique, with focus on keeping the specified speed • The RU will conduct random controls of devices for speed recording and notify the results of controls to NIB SK during the years 2015 and 2016 Addressed to NSA: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NSA will assess whether the RU is fulfilling the conditions of safety certificate and whether its activity are in accordance with national safety regulations
22. 9. 2015	SPAD: station Kalná nad Hronom
	Addressed to RU: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RU conduct controls of train drivers and lessons from practice for train operation, with a focus on monitoring the signalling device
26. 9. 2015	Train derailment: Devínska Nová Ves station Addressee to IM: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IM examine the possibility of installing more indicating devices which draw attention to the unsatisfactory technical condition of the rail vehicle (hot bearings...), regardless of the direction the train running. Also IM examine the possibility watching train transport by employees from both sides of the train.
1. 10. 2015	SPAD: Bratislava-Lamac station
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RU conduct controls of train drivers and lessons from practice for train operation, with a focus on monitoring the signalling device